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The response of Catholics to teaching and nursing the poor has 
become, over the centuries, a vast institutionalized educational system 
and a highly technological delivery system for health care. With the 
Church's emphasis on social justice today, many of us wonder what 
aspects of justice we can and must handle, especially as regards justice 
toward the poor, when so much of our effort must of necessity be 
used to keep our institutions viable. 
There is no question that Catholic institutions are deeply impli-
cated in many dimensions of justice and are called to profound atten-
tion to these dimensions. But we want in this paper to descend from 
such rather formal imperatives and reflect on a specific practice that 
causes many consciences trouble today: Do Catholic institutions have 
an obligation under justice to provide education and health care to the 
poor? In statements of the role and mission or of the meaning of 
sponsorship of Catholic educational or health care institutions, such 
November, 1983 301 
obligations are increasingly taken to be self-evidently matters of 
justice. 
But most basic statements are general, or formal, and are attitudinal 
imperatives ("matters of justice need major attention today"). As 
such, they either lack directives with content or have directives with 
content that are not reconciled with other morally important 
demands. Thereby such statements often bring anxiety, confusion, or 
division. 
It is the purpose of this paper to show that providing education and 'J 
health care to the poor might fall under the rubric of charity for 
private religious educational and health institutions, but it most likely 
is not a matter of justice. I 
If we define justice formally as "giving to each one his/her due," 
the definition remains as a first level principle, i.e., one that cannot 
directly be used to specify action in concrete matters. What counts as 
"due" cannot be discovered by inspection of the formal definition 
itself. Content directives for justice (second-level principles) come 
rather by induction from decisions by individuals in similar situations 
and therefore correlate with cultural and historical contexts. Today 
we often appeal to the social context of "having rights" in order to fill 
in the first level principle and to delineate "what is due" and "who is 
to give it." 
Consequently, we must address the question of the rights of the 
poor to education and health care and specifically ask if the private 
religious institution's purported responsibilities to the poor in justice 
more correctly stand as obligations in charity. 
Let us assume that there are rights, that persons must " have" 
certain items in order to act as rational self-orderers in a society where 
others can supply, deny, or lay claims to the same items. And let us 
confine ourselves to the specific virtue of justice. "General" justice 
covers all activities between persons. Specific justice concentrates on 
how actions by the agent respect what is due to those affected. 
Theories of specific justice traditionally have contained four dimen-
sions: "commutative," which specifies what is due between individual 
persons in private transactions; "contributive," which specifies those 
actions due from individuals or groups which converge to the common 
social good; "retributive," which specifies the assertions of society's 
common values against anti-social actions; and finally, "distributive," 
which specifies the allocation of public social products (both benefits 
and burdens) to individuals and groups. As Iris Young maintains 
(Social Theory and Practice, 7 [1981], pp. 281, 282), theories of 
specific justice fail if they focus, as most contemporary theories do, 
exclusively or primarily on questions of distribution. A major point of 
her critique is that concentration on distributive justice tends to 
emphasize who is to receive what and not what processes are them-
selv.es just. In this paper, we argue that someone's having a right does 
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not always settle who is obligated to act in justice in response to that 
right. 
Let us stipulate also that there are at least four kinds of rights: (1) 
contract rights, which come from any sort of agreement on the part of 
those involved and which are conditioned by the partial fulfillment of 
the contract by any of the parties; (2) merit rights, which accrue to 
those who have performed actions which " deserve" some " reward " or 
who have displayed a characteristic which " deserves" some "reward" 
according to some presupposed " practice" in the social group; (3) posi-
tive or legal rights, which arise through legislative, judicial, and execu-
tive action and are predictions of society's willingness to enforce 
claims of its members by governmental action; and (4) dignity or 
human rights, which belong to persons simply because they are per-
sons in the temporal world. Our focus in this paper will be primarily 
on dignity rights. 
Right Must Be Examined 
Granted that a right of some kind exists, it still must be examined 
whether the right is a "right to pursue" or an "entitlement right." If it 
is the former, the one obligated cannot justly interfere in the pursuit 
or enjoyment of a value or a goal. If it is the latter, the one obligated 
must do what is necessary for the right-holder to be able to actualize 
the acquisition of the value or the goal. 
If it is a matter of a contract right, a merit right, or a positive right, 
it usually is not difficult to distinguish between a "right to pursue" 
and an "entitlement right" because the required actions or omissions 
are expressed in contract specifics, rules or laws. The difficulty comes 
in reference to dignity rights (which today government often tries to 
settle peremptorily by means of legislation or court decisions). 
It is even more difficult to discover who, in such matters, is obli-
gated in justice to act. Take our examples of the right to minimum 
health care and the right to a culturally necessary education. Certainly 
these would be preconditions ..for reasonable efforts at a self-ordered 
life. Are these, then, entitlement rights? And if so, who is obligated? 
Traditionally, the " term" of a right designates the agent who is obli-
gated to act or refrain from acting because of the ethical situation 
which results from a person having a right. Thus, if entitlement rights 
are at issue (and minimum health care and free education have come 
to be seen as entitlement rights), there must be decisions on the 
following questions: 
a) Who (what individual, what social organization, or what societal 
institution) has the obligation? 
b) What exactly is the obligation? (Is it to do an action or to refrain 
from doing an action? and 
c) Why? 
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To complicate matters, as Ruth Macklin notes (Hastings Center 
Report, Oct., 1976, pp. 31, 37, 38), there have been trends in our 
times to extend the field of rights and, therefore, of specific justice. 
Sometimes this has been done by asserting that certain items are rights 
of all persons which had not been claimed before (e.g., health care, 
free education). Sometimes this has been done by asserting that cer-
tain items are rights equally of all (e.g., the right to vote). Sometimes 
this has been done by asserting rights for special classes (e.g., patients, 
the handicapped, the mentally ill). Apparently these are all claimed as 
entitlement rights. 
What is the term of obligation under specific justice correlative to 
such rights? 
It is important to note as a prelude that obligations are not simply 
correlative with rights in justice. One may have the moral obligation to 
act out of other virtues, e.g., sympathy, friendship, charity. Likewise, 
there need not be a right correlative to every duty. Anyone who can 
act for authentic needs of others stands under the rubric of charity 
(today, " minimum altruism" or " benevolence"). An obligation in 
charity might be distinguished as follows: the recipient has no stand-
ing as a rights-holder to demand that the act be done by an assignable 
private individual, and so the private agent is not obligated because of 
being the term of some right; yet there is an obligation because what 
the agent could do would be of significant benefit to the recipient and 
would be of moderate cost to the agent. Thus it is reasonable to do it 
and unreasonable to omit it. (One might see anticipation of this in 
Aquinas's formulation of the maximum permissible and the minimum 
obligatory in alms in reference to "surplus" (Summa Theoiogiae II-II, q. 
32, a. 5 and ad 3; q. 32, a. 6; q. 32, a. 10; q . 185, a. 7). 
Most important for this paper, one might at least question if every-
one has a duty under justice simply because someone has a right, 
especially if it is an entitlement right. 
How, in a complex society, does one identify precisely who is the 
term of some entitlement right and who thereby is obligated to supply 
positive aid so that the right-holder can achieve some goal or value? 
This is the more complicated since in our society there are more 
candidates as possible terms than simply individuals or governmental 
agencies. There are private intermediate organizations which have 
moral independence from the governmental structure. Such private or-
ganizations include business corporations, not-for-profit organizations, 
volunteer groups, professional organizations, and the like, all of which 
have functions in the society in terms of the common good either 
directly as, for example, professional organizations, private hospitals 
and private schools or indirectly as, for example, business corpora-
tions. 
If these intermediary organizations are recognized as legitimate in 




society but as independent of the spectrum of governmental institu-
tions, then our questions of justice would come to this: Are such 
private institutions the terms of entitlement rights? 
Entitlement rights which refer primarily to minimum health care 
and education are expressions of dirnity rights alone (and thereby lack 
contract, merit, or legal specification) and have different terms of 
obligation, depending on the situation. It could be a matter of "each 
other person is obligated to assist until enough do so," as with 
bystanders in an emergency lifesaving situation. But this would be 
tempered by the limit that no one is obligated in justice to be heroic. 
Now the values of education and health care are rarely satisfied by 
single emergency acts. Moreover, the rights to these values only exist 
where they have become standardly available in the social cooperative 
context. To claim them as rights and as p.xpressions of dignity rights 
alone, therefore, is to claim them from the social cooperative achieve-
ments in producing values, that is, to claim them from society. It is to 
claim them under the rubric of distributive justice. With entitlement 
rights under distributive justice, the right-holder has standing to claim 
actions be done by an assignable societal unit (according to subsidiarity). 
Governmental institutions are the ordinary instruments to assure the 
fair distribution of the socially produced benefits and burdens. 
Instruments for Distributive Justice? 
The question then is: Have private intermediate organizations also 
become such instruments for distributive justice? 
One might suggest this. Entitlement rights arise in the historical, 
social and political situation, and the terms of these rights are a 
function of that situation. Thus, it is reasonable to judge that obliga-
tions to provide the pertinent goal or value exist along a social and 
political "subsidiarity" spectrum: one's family, one's neighbors, one's 
ward, district, city, county, state, and federal government. Insofar as a 
more proximate subsidiarity element can provide, the more remote 
element does not have an obligation to do so. Its obligation would be 
to refrain from interference. 
This, of course, still leaves the private intermediate organization in 
limbo with respect to obligations under justice toward entitlement 
rights. 
To further our questioning we must sketch the form for any institu-
tional ethic. 
The rationale for the practices of any institution, public or private, 
would be in reference to the values that can be achieved only insofar 
as the institution runs well. Thus, if there is a public common good for 
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society, a common good that is part of the purpose of the society 
existing as a cooperative unity, then there could validly be formulated 
an ethic of societal purposes about governmental institutions and 
their included practices that would be at least different from a per-
sonal ethic in standards and in obligations. 
In a scheme of social cooperation for a common good, citizens have 
entitlement rights to those items needed as necessary conditions to act 
as self-ordering beings. Thus society, in subsidiary stages, reasonably is 
obliged through institutions to supply such items, insofar as the com-
mon good is achieved and the trade-offs are reasonable. 
An analogous rationale and ethic could be formulated for a private 
organization within society in terms of the practices requisite for its 
legitimate, important, or even necessary values. And those who held 
positions in such a private organization would have obligations in 
justice to those within and without the organization who supported it 
and who had standing to demand it be run well. With respect to 
general obligations toward society, private organizations vary with 
how each fits into the general social scheme. Certainly officials in such 
organizations are obligated to those they affect in the following ways: 
to exercise due care (e.g., check out details of operations); be reason-
ably well informed (e.g., keep up with field, know potential effects on 
the community of its own activities); be aware of alternatives tp 
achieve goals, so as to reduce external costs to those affected (e .g., 
which alternative way to handle street repairs most reduces noise 
pollution). 
To discern the special obligations that pertain to each kind of pri-
vate intermediate organization in society, it is reasonable to ask: 
"What is the organization's concept of its purpose (its self-defini-
tion)?" This will be in some wayan expression of a private or a 
public good. Since any private intermediate orgalJization operates 
within a scheme of social cooperation, the purpose must involve either 
some public good directly or at least no public harm. Let us take two 
examples: a private business corporation and a private hospital or 
school. 
The business corporation is formed by free association for the benefit 
of its members (stockholders, managers, workers). Its obligation to the 
rest of society combines contractual obligations (to customers), legal 
obligations (corporate law), and the obligation not to do harm (as well 
as the general obligations above as applicable). This last may reason-
ably be specified by society through its governmental institutions. 
The private hospital or school is slightly different. Its self-definition 
of purpose is to serve some segment of society in respect to some 
values, to which values members of society may also have rights. This 
being so, do members of society have claims under justice on the 
private hospital or school, and to which members of society, if any, 
does the private hospital or school have obligations? 
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The following would seem to pertain. If the private organization is 
supported solely by private funds, its general obligation is to serve 
the purposes of those who support it, which purposes ideally will be 
identical with the self-definition purposes of the institution. The 
question will be, what are the obligations in terms of justice to all 
those in society who are included within the purpose in the self-defini-
tion? And is the question of justice in reference to those who support 
the institution, or in reference to those in the whole society who 
might be served by it? 
It must be remembered that in the matter of entitlement rights 
where the individual cannot achieve the necessary items by personal 
effort, then the society, through subsidiarity stages (first the local, 
then the state, and finally the federal government), is obligated in 
terms of distributive justice to the general common good (e.g., to 
provide minimal health care and education as necessary to be self-
orderer in one's activities). So the public has hospitals and schools in 
terms of distributive justice. 
Place of the Private Intermediate Organization 
Where does the private intermediate organization fit in? Certainly, 
if the organization "accepts" a person in a contract (as student, as 
patient), there are contractual obligations, whose limits are positively 
described in the individual contract, and negatively that the one party 
will not take advantage of the necessities of the other party. But are 
there any positive obligations to serve the values or goals of the indi-
vidual in society beyond such contracts? How does the private inter-
mediate organization stand towctrd entitlement rights of citizens? One 
might judge that there are obligations if (a) the situation pertains to 
the organization's ordinary competence, and (b) it is an emergency 
(e.g., a wounded individual shows up at a private hospital) . But are 
there general obligations to set up practices of the private intermediate 
organization to respond to entitlement rights of citizens in general? Of 
course, as mentioned above , if the government legislates regulations, 
e .g., affirmative action hiring or admissions, then the private organiza-
tion has the ordinary obligation to obey the law. Our question is 
whether the private organization has any obligations under justice 
without such governmental regulations. 
According to a tradition of justice which distinguishes commutative 
(interpersonal), social (contributive), and distributive justice, the 
private intermediate organizations do not fall under distributive justice 
agents. But one might suggest that such a tradition can evolve with the 
" contemporary experience of interdependence of individuals, govern-
ment, and intermediate organizations. 
Suppose there were a call for a private organization to "become 
involved in justice." As we have seen, there are many dimensions of 
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obligation that pertain and to which the organization could attend and 
should attend already. But obviously, something more is called for in 
the "becoming involved in justice." For example, the call could be 
made "to give free tuition to the poor" or "to set up special practices 
to search out and treat the very poor with no charge or with lower 
charges." Would such a practice be a response "in terms of justice"? 
Certainly it could not be so, if such a practice entailed a tradeoff 
with some practice already required in terms of justice obligations (for 
example, the costs in time taken from specific contract obligations or 
general professional in-service programs). 
But what if such a tradeoff is not obviously entailed? For example, 
teachers have been heard to say, "It doesn't matter if I have 25 or 28 
students; why don't we fill up the extra chairs?" To evaluate any such 
apparent non-tradeoff suggestion, it might be proper to examine the 
self-definition of the private intermediate organization and the pur-
pose of the organization in the mind of its supporters. This examina-
tion might conclude that the matter indeed is vague since, in the 
organization's original thought, such contemplated practices were 
neither embraced nor rejected. So, some discussion and self-education 
could be reasonable. 
But this would seem to indicate that taking on the new practice 
could be, at most, an ethical obligation under charity that did not 
violate justice in respect to the already acknowledged obligations. It 
would not establish that the new practice would itself be a matter of 
justice and hence obligatory in that way. 
Could it indeed be obligatory in justice and simply a matter of 
heretofore not recognizing it? This might be argued under the form: 
"8 is required in society because Pn have rights to s; but we can supply 
s; therefore, justice demands that we supply s to Pn." 
This argument has two major problems: it is absijract, and it begs 
the original question. First, it is abstract for it does not establish that 
"to supply s to Pn" is a higher obligation than the organization's 
present practices. Ought implies can, but can does not imply ought. 
One must further establish that what can be done (a) is proportion-
ately reasonable, given the obligations one already has, and (b) is an 
obligation under justice and not rather an obligation under some other 
virtue, or even an option. This opens to the second problem. The 
argument begs the question whether a private intermediate organiza-
tion is the proper term of entitlement rights in a society, especially 
when subsidiary governmental institutions (e.g., public hospitals, 
public schools) arguably are adequate to be the term of the entitle-
ment rights. 
As we said at the outset of this paper, our Catholic institutions have 
fruitful areas for working for justice: employer-employee relation-
ships, wages and working conditions, opportunities for minorities, the 
handicapped and women in the work force, inservice education, etc. 
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As Thomas C. Kelly, O.P., said (Hospital Progress, May, 1979, p. 39): 
"The Catholic community will be hampered in efforts to advocate 
social justice and to advance its Gospel mission to the world unless all 
its institutions are themselves models of justice." 
So when the calls for justice ring out, religious congregations have 
many places to apply their efforts. Their institutions, rather than an 
albatross around their necks, are more a corporate eagle to do what 
they were established to do and to do it justly. But calls "to serve the 
poor in justice" too often cause only anguish in the consciences that 
years of religious training have sensitized. 
We suggest that many of the "calls to justice" are consciousness-
raising exercises. As such, they are formal, first level expressions of 
ethical attitudes which must be specified before they can articulate 
obligations. And it may turn out that the obligations actually are 
under charity rather than under justice. 
Let us imagine the following scenario: The operating board of Cath-
olic High, in view of its role and mission statement, agrees that two 
percent of its net income will be set aside solely for free scholarships 
to the deserving poor. That is a laudable step and one may hope it 
represents the sentiments of the entire community which supports the 
school. It must be remembered that the allocated money is not the 
board's to dispose of without constraint. To see the response in this 
scenario as one of justice is wrong. Rather, the action is one of 
charity, and the supporting community must have a voice in the 
allocation of the funds or else the failure here might be a failure in 
justice to the tuition-payers and contributors. 
Scholarships may be used as businesses use advertising; namely, to 
raise the overall academic level of the school and thus to make it more 
attractive, or to bring on campus an outstanding athlete who will serve 
to do the same. But scholarships offered to the poor simply because 
they are poor are a matter of charity, not justice, for the' private 
intermediate organization that is the Catholic school. 
So, too, with Catholic hospitals . Health care costs are escalating at 
an alarming rate. If the religious communities sponsoring those hos-
pitals want to respond with free health care for the poor, where will 
the money come from? If the congregation has a fund and makes it 
available to the sick poor in the community, one cannot say that any 
one of these sick poor has a right to that fund. The money supplied 
r.ould be to satisfy an obligation in charity and would be applied on a 
first-come, first-served basis. The case would be the same if the hos-
pital developed a charitable fund, seeking donations for the same end. 
As we advance in the knowledge and appreciation of rights, respon-
sibilities, and obligations, it becomes more evident that we cannot lay 
all our contemporary problems at the threshold of justice; charity still 
has its place. 
November, 1983 309 
